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Introduction 
Facebook completely failed to warn Jane Doe about the human 
traffickers it knew were using its website to groom and recruit their 
victims. These human trafficking victims were then compelled to 
participate in commercial sex acts, like Jane Doe was after her 
trafficking from Facebook’s platform. All the while, Facebook was 
knowingly benefited from the traffickers’ use of its platform. Facebook 
has already lost the argument that the Communications Decency Act 
(CDA), 47 U.S.C. Section 230, prevents it from being held liable in this 
case, but lodges an extraordinary request to stay the trial court’s 
proceedings during this mandamus. 
Facebook’s request for stay is not based on some imminent harm 
Facebook faces if this Court decides the trial court ruled incorrectly—
there is no trial setting or disclosure of privileged documents just over 
the horizon. Facebook’s wants to stay trial court proceedings solely 
because it believes its already rejected arguments will prevail on 
mandamus, and in the meantime it does not want to spend resources 
defending against Jane Doe’s claims. 
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But the trial court already rejected the same arguments, as did 
the 151st District Court in a virtually identical context,1 so there is no 
reason to believe Facebook will prevail during this third bite at the 
apple. If anything, the presumption should favor Jane Doe—she 
remains the prevailing party. 
While Facebook goes to great lengths to emphasize the number 
of courts that have dismissed claims against internet service providers 
under the CDA, it neglects to mention that all of those decisions 
predate the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking 
Act of 2017 (“FOSTA”), Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018). 
FOSTA amended Section 230 to clarify that human trafficking claims 
such as those brought by Jane Doe are not covered by the CDA.  
Facebook’s request to stay is just the latest of many delay tactics. 
Facebook has been relentlessly resisting discovery in this litigation—
even jurisdictional discovery oriented to Facebook’s special 
appearance. There is little reason to give it a pass on complying with its 
discovery obligations for the duration of this mandamus proceeding. 
Finally, Facebook’s recent announcement of its off Facebook activity 
 
1 Exhibit A. 
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project creates a very real danger that as the Court considers its 
mandamus, Facebook will be destroying evidence that is relevant to 
Jane Doe’s claims. 
We will begin with a discussion of FOSTA because the 
amendments to the CDA are the clearest indication that Congress 
never intended the statute to be a defense to sex trafficking claims. The 
argument then turns to the more general subject of why Texas 
statutory and common-law claims would not be preempted by the CDA 
in any event. Following that will be a discussion of Facebook’s thus-far 
successful attempts to avoid any meaningful discovery in this case and 
the fact that it may be systematically destroying evidence relevant to 
this case in the pursuit of its Off Facebook privacy initiative. 
I. In 2018, the FOSTA Amendments Made It Clear That 
Congress Never Intended for the CDA to Preclude Sex 
Trafficking Claims 
Facebook’s argument for a stay of trial court proceedings is based 
upon its rather obviously self-interested description of the CDA’s 
operation. Motion for Stay, pp. 1-4. If Facebook is wrong in its 
interpretation of the CDA, there is nothing left of its argument for a 
stay. The 2018 amendments to the CDA make it clear that Facebook is 
wrong.  
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As the largely federal case law that Facebook relies upon  
developed, defendants engaged in sex trafficking of minors 
increasingly used Section 230 as a shield. See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2016) (claims that 
website facilitates illegal conduct by posting ads for human trafficking 
are foreclosed by Section 230). Congress addressed this problem in 
2018 when it passed FOSTA, which, among other things, amended 
Section 230 to clarify that it was never intended to apply to human 
trafficking claims. 
 Congress passed FOSTA in April 2018 and clearly stated its 
intent in the enacting clause: 
To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to clarify that 
section 230 of such Act does not prohibit the enforcement 
against providers and users of interactive computer 
services of Federal and State criminal and civil law relating 
to sexual exploitation of children or sex trafficking, and for 
other purposes. 
 Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018) (emphasis added). This 
statement of purpose includes civil law claims such as Jane Doe’s.  
The “sense of Congress,” according to FOSTA, was that Section 
230 “was never intended to provide legal protection to . . . websites that 
facilitate traffickers in advertising the sale of unlawful sex acts with sex 
trafficking victims.” Id. at sec. 2(1). Thus, the point of the amendment 
 
Response to Motion to Stay  Page 5 
 
was “to ensure that such section does not provide such protection to 
such websites.” Id. at sec. 2(3). 
 The judicial opinions interpreting Section 230 as providing 
broad immunity to internet service providers, upon which Facebook 
relies, were the motivation for the amendment. As Senator Portman 
explained, the Act “was never intended to protect those who knowingly 
facilitate the sex trafficking of vulnerable women and girls.” 163 Cong. 
Rec. S3965, S3977 (daily ed. July 13, 2017). 
None of the cases cited by Facebook are sex trafficking claims 
that were decided after FOSTA took effect. We are unaware of any 
appellate decisions in the entire nation that post-date FOSTA. There is 
no reason to think the courts—even the federal courts—will not follow 
the direct expression of Congressional intent found in FOSTA. 
II. Basic Preemption Doctrine Demonstrates that the CDA, 
No Matter How Interpreted, Does Not Preempt State 
Law Claims 
The CDA states: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any 
State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with 
this section. No cause of action may be brought and no 
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that 
is inconsistent with this section. 
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47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). Facebook ignores the savings clause; as long as 
state-law claims are consistent with Section 230, they are not 
preempted. Jane Doe is asserting state statutory and common-law 
claims that are consistent with Section 230 as amended. 
There is always a presumption against preemption, especially 
when the state causes of action involves matters of public health and 
safety—matters over which states have historically exercised primary 
authority. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484 (1996). 
Accordingly, courts must assume “that the historic police powers of the 
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Id. 
 Texas’s human trafficking statute addresses matters of public 
health and safety by providing redress to minors who have been 
victimized by human traffickers and those who facilitate trafficking. 
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 98.002. The Texas Supreme Court has 
held that common-law actions based upon negligence involve the 
state’s power to regulate health and safety matters and are therefore 
protected by the heightened presumption against federal preemption. 
Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Estate of Wells, 52 S.W.3d 737, 743 (Tex. 
2001). 
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The conclusion to be drawn from the presumption against 
preemption is that even if the federal cases Facebook relies upon were 
correctly decided—and Jane Doe will have much to say on this subject 
in response to the petition—those decisions are not controlling on a 
state court deciding state law issues. So Facebook’s arguments that a 
stay is “necessary” to comply with the CDA, Motion at 3-4, is only 
relevant to a federal court facing causes of action that do not relate to 
human trafficking. 
III. Particularly in Light of Facebook’s Discovery 
Recalcitrance, a Stay Prejudices Jane Doe 
Facebook notes that discovery “is still in its early stages here.” Id. 
at 5. But that is because Facebook has vigorously resisted Jane Doe’s 
every attempt to obtain discovery in this litigation. 
Immediately following the filing of Jane Doe’s lawsuit, she 
attempted to obtain discovery from Facebook.  Jane Doe has served 
jurisdictional discovery, proposed stipulations on jurisdictional facts, 
merits-based discovery, requests for disclosures, request for a 
protective order, a request for privilege log and a request for 
depositions without any meaningful response.  Her discovery requests 
have been met with consistent resistance. 
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Jane Doe has had to file Motions to Compel on both sets of 
discovery sent to Facebook. But for Facebook’s continued efforts to 
resist discovery, the case would be much further along. To the extent 
that Facebook complains the discovery is overbroad, the trial court is 
in the best position to consider that argument. A stay will prevent that 
from occurring. Any continued delay in the discovery process will 
prejudice Jane Doe. 
IV. The Off-Facebook Project Appears to Pose a Threat to 
Jane Doe’s Ability to Obtain Evidence 
In late August, Facebook announced the launch of a new tool 
called “off-Facebook activity” that would enable users themselves to 
remove entirely the third-party website information that Facebook has 
been storing for years. Contained within that universe of data is likely 
information that Jane Doe has been seeking in discovery in this case. 
Facebook itself described this initiative: 
If you clear your off-Facebook activity, we’ll remove your 
identifying information from the data that apps and 
websites choose to send us. We won’t know which websites 
you visited or what you did there, and we won’t use any of 
the data you disconnect to target ads to you on Facebook, 
Instagram or Messenger. 
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Facebook, Now You Can See and Control the Data That Apps and 
Websites Share With Facebook, https://newsroom.fb.com/news/ 
2019/08/off-facebook-activity/(Aug. 20, 2019). 
 Jane Doe assumes that Facebook is in the process of following 
through with its representations and allowing users—potentially 
including the predators that trafficked her—to delete information 
contained on their itemized browsing history. If that occurs before 
Jane Doe is afforded an opportunity to obtain discovery from 
Facebook, it will obviously impair Jane Doe’s preparation of her case. 
 A stay of proceedings in the trial court increases this already 
present risk, and thus prejudices Jane Doe. 
V. Conclusion 
Jane Doe asks that the request for stay be denied. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS 
334th JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS 
334th JUDICIAL DISTRICT· 
Defendant Facebook seeks dismissal of these two cases pursuant to 91a of the 
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion is one of several procedural preliminary 
hurdles that the parties advise will be filed and argued in these cases prior to full 
litigation of the underlying claims. While a ruling in Facebook's favor may end the case 
for Facebook, a ruling for the Plaintiffs only allows the case to proceed to the next level. 
Rule 91a requires dismissal of a claim if the action "has no basis in law or fact. A 
cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with 
inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle a claimant to_ the relief sought. A 
cause of action has no basis in fact if no reasonable person could believe the facts 
pleaded." Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1. The Court may not consider evidence, but only the 
allegations in the petition and arguments of counsel in their motions and responses. At 
this stage, Facebook is not arguing the facts, but rather claims it is not liable to the 
Plaintiffs because of the immunity granted internet service providers under Section 230 
of the Federal Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (the "Act"). 
47 USC§ 230(c)(1) provides: "No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider." In 2018, Congress added exclusions to this 
broad grant of immunity to ensure that sex trafficking laws were not impacted. The 
parties debate the extent of the exclusions. 
The parties do not dispute that Facebook is an interactive computer service as 
defined in the statute at 47 § USC 230(f)(2) . The question presented to the Court is 
EXHIBIT A
whether the claims raised by Plaintiffs treat Facebook as the publisher or speaker of 
information provided by another. 
Plaintiffs have brought causes of action sounding in negligence, gross 
negligence and statutory damages under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code · 
Chapter 98, which allows for damages from persons who engage in trafficking or 
knowingly or intentionally benefit from such traffic. Plaintiffs contend that Facebook 
facilitates and/or was used by predators to find, groom, target, recruit and kidnap 
children into the sex trade. Plaintiffs allege that Facebook profits from the collection of 
data and the use of the data to target and promote interactions between Facebook 
users. These interactions include minors and sexual predators. Each of the Plaintiffs 
are victims of human trafficking to whom Plaintiffs contend Facebook owes a variety of 
duties which have been breached leading to the Plaintiffs being victimized in human 
trafficking. Plaintiffs contend they are not seeking to impose liability for the publication 
of the third party communications, but rather they seek to impose liability for Facebook's 
independent actions or failure to act, specifically failure to warn, negligence in 
undertaking to protect potential victims of sex trafficking, and for knowingly facilitating 
and benefiting from the sex trade. 
Facebook contends that all of Plaintiffs' claims turn entirely on the 
communications Plaintiffs had with malicious third parties. Because Plaintiffs' injuries 
are dependent on those communications, Facebook contends they are all barred by the 
immunity granted internet service providers under the Act. 
The language of the statute is broad and both parties have cited cases that 
support their positions. Facebook points to the broad grants of immunity articulated in 
Zeran v. America Online Inc. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (republishing defamation) and 
Doe v. MySpace, Inc. 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (negligence-failure to implement 
safety measures), among others. Plaintiffs points to the more narrow immunity 
recognized in Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016) (ISP not immune 
to failure to warn claim) and Huon v. Denton, 841 F .3d 733 (?'h Cir. 2016) (ISP not 
immune to defamation in content it generated). 
While the injuries presented in the 9th and 5th Circuit cases are similar to those 
presented in this case, the failure to warn cause of action presented in this case mirrors 
that presented in the 9th Circuit case. None of the cases deal with the statutory cause of 
action pied in this case, and all of the cases pre-dated the amendments adopted in 
2018. 
The few Texas cases that have addressed the issue come out of the Beaumont 
Court of Appeals and none of these deal with the same causes of action or facts as are 
presented in this case. See Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 
2010, no pet.) (defamation); GoDaddy.com LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) (intentional infliction of emotional distress); and, Davis v. 
Motiva Enterprises LLC, No. 09-14-00434-CV, 2015 WL 1535694 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont April 2, 2015, pet. denied) (failure to supervise employees' internet use). 
EXHIBIT A
In reviewing the statute and the cases cited by the parties, the Court concludes 
that Plaintiffs have plead causes of action that would not be barred by the immunity 
granted under the Act. Accordingly, Defendants' Rule 91A Motions to Dismiss are 
denied. 
Signed: ~ ~[c () 
5/23/201 9  ~ 
STEVEN KIRKLAND 
Judge Presiding 
EXHIBIT A
